When the rivers run dry : liquidity and the use of wholesale funds in the transmission of the U.S. subprime crisis by Raddatz, Claudio
Policy Research Working Paper 5203
When the Rivers Run Dry
Liquidity and the Use of Wholesale Funds 






















































































































dProduced by the Research Support Team
Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5203
This paper provides systematic evidence of the role of 
banks’ reliance on wholesale funding in the international 
transmission of the ongoing financial crisis. It conducts 
an event study to estimate the impact of the liquidity 
crunch of September 15, 2008, on the stock price returns 
of 662 individual banks across 44 countries, and tests 
whether differences in the abnormal returns observed 
around those events relate to these banks’ ex-ante reliance 
on wholesale funding. Globally and within countries, 
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banks that relied more heavily in non-deposit sources of 
funds experienced a significantly larger decline in stock 
returns even after controlling for other mechanisms. 
Within a country, the abnormal returns of banks with 
high wholesale dependence fell about 2 percent more 
than those of banks with low dependence during the 
three days following Lehman Brothers’ bankruptcy. This 
large differential return suggests that liquidity played an 
important role in the transmission of the crisis.When the Rivers Run Dry: 
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1 Introduction 
During the second half of 2007, the problems caused by the increase in defaults in US subprime 
mortgages observed since late 2006 quickly started to spread across asset classes and countries. 
This spread resulted in an international financial crisis that was still ongoing as of September 
2009, and that has had strong repercussions in the real US and global economy.  
The crisis has reshaped the global financial landscape: Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers, two 
of the largest US investment banks, merged or filed for bankruptcy. The US government bailed 
out Citibank and Bank of America, the two largest US banks, and the insurance giant AIG, and 
put  under  conservatorship  Fannie  Mae  and  Freddy  Mac,  the  two  largest  US  mortgage 
companies. As a result, the traditional model of investment banking that dominated Wall Street 
during the 20
th century disappeared altogether. Outside the US, many large financial institutions 
have either experienced large losses or been taken over by their governments, such as BNP 
Paribas in France, Northern Rock in the UK, UBS in Switzerland, and IKB in Germany, just to 
name a few. In other countries, like Iceland and Ireland, the whole banking system has been at 
the verge of collapse and has received massive government bailouts and guarantees.
1 
The magnitude and reach of the ongoing financial crisis, several orders of magnitude larger than 
the size of the initial shock, has led many to wonder how a shock to a seemingly small segment 
of the US financial market managed to propagate so much, so fast. In fact, by July 2007 most 
analysts still expected limited consequences from the collapse of the subprime mortgage market 
because it represented only about 12 percent of the overall US mortgage market, which in turn 
was  only  30  percent  of  US  fixed  income  markets  (Deutsche  Bank,  2007).  As  frequently 
mentioned, US stock markets routinely dealt with the expected losses in subprime loans, then 
valued at about $200 billion. A widespread contagion across asset classes and especially across 
countries  was,  by  most  analysts,  considered  unlikely.  For  instance,  on  May  17,  2007,  the 
chairman of the US Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, stated: “We believe the effect of the troubles 
in  the  subprime sector on the  broader  housing market  will  be  limited  and  we  do  not  expect 
significant spillovers from the subprime market to the rest of the economy or to the financial 
system.” 
                                                 
1 On September 30
th, 2008, Ireland’s finance minister announced a blanket guarantee on the deposits and 
almost all the debt of the country’s six biggest banks until September 2010. The Iceland government 
nationalized its three largest banks on early October 2008. 2 
 
Although a standard real channel through trade linkages with the US has undoubtedly played a 
role in the international transmission of the crisis (Levchenko et al. 2009), the timing of some of 
the  events  strongly  suggests  that  the  first  line  of  action  took  place  through  international 
financial linkages. For instance, the bank run on Northern Rock took place in September 2007, 
only one month after the beginning of the crisis in the US and when the US economy had not 
started to contract yet.  
Among possible sources of financial linkages, in addition to  common portfolio investors and 
herding, the worldwide reliance of financial institutions on short-term wholesale funds is a likely 
major contributor to the spread of the malaise because one of the most outstanding stylized 
facts about this crisis is the sharp and widespread collapse in liquidity provision (Acharya and 
Merrouche,  2009;  Brunetti  et  al.  2009).  This  collapse  took  place  in  two  stages:  first  at  the 
beginning of August 2007, immediately after BNP Paribas ceased redemptions in three of its 
funds, and second, and most importantly, in mid September 2008, following Lehman Brothers 
bankruptcy filing and the announcement of the US government bailout of AIG. These sharp 
contractions  in  liquidity  provision  have  been the  focus of  recent  papers  that  have  proposed 
explanations based on the interaction between margin calls and market liquidity, the cyclicality 
of leverage, and the role of Knightian uncertainty (Brunnermeier, 2009; Adrian and Shin, 2009; 
and  Caballero  and  Krishnamurthy,  2008).  In  fact,  although  the  ongoing  crisis  was  initially 
dubbed the “subprime crisis” some authors have started to refer to it as the “liquidity crunch of 
2007-2008” (Brunnermeier, 2009).  
Financial institutions worldwide have increasingly relied on wholesale funding to supplement 
demand deposits as a source of funds, becoming, therefore, vulnerable to a sudden dry up of 
these  sources  of  funds.  Although  the  earlier  literature  emphasized  the  benefits  of  these 
alternative sources of financing (Feldman and Schmidt, 2001; Calomiris, 1999), some voices of 
concern about the implications of this liability structure for systemic vulnerability have recently 
been raised. For instance, Rajan (2006) noted that banks’ greater reliance on market liquidity 
makes their balance sheets more suspect in times of crisis. These concerns increased as the 
ongoing financial crisis started to unfold, and recently various papers and publications have 
suggested that banks’ reliance on wholesale funds may be behind the failure of some institutions. 
In another paper, Shin (2009) indicates that the cause of the Northern Rock demise was not its 
reliance on securitization, but rather its high leverage, coupled with its reliance on institutional 
investors for short-term funding. The Economist (2008), citing Citigroup analysts stated that: 
“A growing number of banks are being subjected to a wholesale version of a bank run, with 3 
 
access to wholesale funding evaporating in a matter of days, if not hours”. Also in its recent 
review of the causes of the recent financial crisis, Brunnermeier (2009) indicates that banks’ 
increasing use of short-term maturity instruments left them particularly exposed to a dry-up in 
funding liquidity, and Huang and Ratnovski (2008) present a theoretical model that highlights 
the  dark  side  of  bank  wholesale  funding.  However,  despite  the  emphasis  put  on  the  use  of 
wholesale funding as a source of propagation of the crisis, and the anecdotal evidence from cases 
like the one of Northern Rock, there is so far no systematic evidence of its role and its potential 
to facilitate broad international contagion independently of other real and financial transmission 
mechanisms.  
This paper provides such systematic evidence of the importance of banks’ reliance on wholesale 
funding as a source of vulnerability, and of its contribution to the international transmission of 
the  ongoing  financial  crisis.  It  constructs  individual  bank-level  measures  of  vulnerability  to 
different transmission mechanisms for 662 banks across 44 countries excluding the US, and uses 
a methodology that combines ingredients from a standard event study with those of difference-
in-difference estimation for identification. In particular, the paper focuses on the largest liquidity 
crunch  episode  of  the  crisis:  the  money  market  freeze  following  the  bankruptcy  of  Lehman 
Brothers on September 15, 2008 (henceforth “Lehman”), studies its impact on the stock-price 
returns  of  individual banks,  and tests  whether differences in the abnormal  returns  observed 
around those episodes are related to the banks’ ex-ante reliance on wholesale funding, as it 
would be if  this reliance contributed to the propagation of the crisis. In addition, the paper  
checks whether a similar pattern of differential returns is observed after the initial stages of the 
liquidity crunch that took place on August 9, 2007. 
The results show that the banking sector across the world experienced a large and significant 
abnormal  return  decline  following  this  event.  Banks’  returns  worldwide  declined  about  2.9 
percent in the three days after Lehman. Furthermore, banks that before the crisis relied more 
heavily on wholesale funding experienced a larger abnormal return decline in response to US 
events than other banks. In the days following Lehman, within a country, the returns of banks 
with high wholesale dependence (75
th percentile) declined 1.6 percent more than those with low 
wholesale dependence (25
th percentile). This difference is not only large but also statistically 
significant. Quantitatively,  the  results  show  that  the  use  of  wholesale  funds  can  explain  an 
important fraction of the early global transmission of this event, confirming that the widespread 
use of these types of funds played a significant role in the propagation of the financial crisis. A 
similar but weaker pattern emerges during the early stages of the crisis (August 9, 2007) which 4 
 
confirms the presence of liquidity based transmission but suggests that other factors, such as the 
exposure  of  international  banks  to  subprime  mortgages,  may  have  initially  played  a  more 
important role. 
The main findings of the paper on the differential impact of the event on banks with higher 
wholesale dependence rely only on the within country, across-banks variation of the data, so 
they are not driven by country-level differences on the incidence of the crisis, or on any measure 
of  aggregate  exposure.  The  paper  also  shows  that  these  results  are  robust  to  a  battery  of 
changes in the details of the specification and estimation, and to controls for other potential 
sources  of  differential  effects  related  to  individual  banks’  riskiness,  size,  direct  exposure  to 
Lehman  Brothers,  ownership,  or  specialization.  The  results  also  indicate  that  some  country 
characteristics, such as the coverage of deposit insurance, the amount of international reserves, 
and  the  quality  of  financial  regulation,  can  reduce  the  vulnerability  of  wholesale  dependent 
banks  to  liquidity  crunches,  while  other  characteristics  such  as  the  degree  of  financial  and 
banking integration may amplify them. Finally, there is some evidence that the distress caused 
by Lehman on wholesale dependent banks resulted in a contraction of their lending activity, 
indicating that this source of vulnerability had consequences for the real economy.  
This paper relates to several strands of literature. First, and most directly, it relates to the 
recent theoretical and empirical literature on the amplification and propagation of the financial 
crisis. This literature has proposed several mechanisms that may have contributed to spread and 
amplify the initial shocks. Some papers focus on ultimate mechanisms, such as the presence of 
Knightian uncertainty among investors that leads them to value returns according to worst case 
scenarios and withhold liquidity (Caballero and Krishnamurthy, 2008), or the combination of 
leverage  and  margin  cycles  affecting  market  makers  and  inducing  them  to  further  liquidate 
assets (Brunnermeier, 2009). Other papers emphasize proximate causes of the transmission, such 
as the use of wholesale funds (Shin, 2009), or the use of pro-cyclical leverage (Adrian and Shin, 
2008). Finally, some recent papers have tried to assess the role of different mechanisms in the 
transmission of the crisis. Eichengreen et al. (2009) study the role of common factors on the 
movement of the spreads of the debt of 45 banks in nine developed countries and relate their 
estimated factors to several potential causes of crisis transmission. They find that the share of 
variance of bank spreads explained by common factors is typically high and increased during the 
crisis, suggesting that the forces behind the crisis affect all banks equally, and show that these 
factors’ correlation with measures of banks’ credit risk also rises during the crisis. Interestingly, 
they also find that the share of variation explained by the common factors briefly increased after 5 
 
the failure of Lehman. Tong and Wei (2008) follow a similar approach to this paper, and test 
whether  the  crisis  spills  over  to  the  real  economy  through  reducing  consumer  demand  or 
tightening liquidity. They look at the stock price response of non-financial firms in the US, 
between July 31, 2007 and March 31, 2008, and test whether a firm’s sensitivity to consumer 
demand or financial constraints better explains the cross-section of returns, finding that a firm’s 
degree of financial constraints explains a larger fraction of the stock price declines observed in 
the US. This paper contributes to this literature by providing systematic evidence of the role of 
the  sources  of  bank  financing  in  the  international  transmission  of  the  crisis.  In  contrast  to 
Eichengreen et al. (2009), this paper looks at a broad set of banks across a large number of 
developed and developing countries, and for the most part focuses on differences in returns 
across individual banks to identify a specific transmission mechanism rather than focusing on 
common factors and their determinants. This paper shares with Tong and Wei (2008) the use of 
stock  market  returns  and  ex-ante  characteristics  to  identify  the  role  of  a  transmission 
mechanism, but it looks at the international transmission of the crisis to the banking sector 
instead of the transmission to  non-financial  US industries, and focuses on the  stock market 
responses to a clearly defined episode to identify the mechanism, instead of looking at the long-
run performance of stock price returns. 
Another  recent  literature  closely  related  to  this  paper  has  focused  on  the  role  of  interbank 
markets  in  the  allocation  of  liquidity  during  the  crisis,  and  on  the  appropriate  policy 
interventions in these markets. Motivated by the drying up of interbank markets during the 
recent crisis and the lack of theoretical foundations for central bank intervention, Allen Carletti 
and  Gale  (2008)  and  Freixas,  Martin,  and  Skeie  (2009)  present  theoretical  models  of  the 
functioning of interbank markets and derive optimal policies that provide and allocate liquidity 
among banks. On the empirical side, Brunetti, di Filippo, and Harris (2009) study the impact of 
central bank intervention on European interbank markets during the crisis using high frequency 
and find that these interventions seem to have increased the level and volatility of spreads, 
which they interpret as evidence of a crowding out of private liquidity. Cassola, Hortacsu, and 
Kastl (2009) use bidding data from the European Central Bank (ECB) auctions for one-week 
loans  to  study  how the  bidding  schedule  of  banks  changes  during the  crisis and  how these 
changes relate to ex-post bank performance. They document that banks bid more aggressively 
for ECB funds after the beginning of the crisis in August 2007, and that the stock price of banks 
that were more willing to pay for these funds, those facing higher liquidity costs, performed 
relatively worse. This paper complements this literature by providing further evidence of the 
consequences of a drying up of interbank lending markets on banks’ performance and lending 6 
 
activities  worldwide,  thus  highlighting  the  possibility  of  international  contagion  and  giving 
further ground for liquidity support by central banks.     
The  paper  also  relates  to  the  literature  on  financial  structure  and  riskiness.  Rajan  (2006) 
highlights  the  risks  that  the  recent  process  of  financial  innovation,  deregulation,  and 
disintermediation (from banks), creates for the financial system. He argues that the movement 
of increasing shares of financial transactions to arm’s length markets, while beneficial, creates 
new risks associated with the incentives faced by asset managers. This changing landscape also 
modifies the behavior and portfolio of banks toward distributing standard risks and warehousing 
other,  more  opaque  risks,  while  becoming  potentially  less  able  to  play  their  crucial  role  as 
liquidity providers in times of distress. The increased reliance of banks on non-deposit sources of 
funds  may  further  raise  the  distrust  of  investors  on  the  liquidity  position  of  banks  and 
undermine  their  ability  to  gather  spare  liquidity.  In  fact,  as  shown  by  Gatev  and  Strahan 
(2006),  during  the  1998  Russian  crisis,  investors  perceived  banks  with  higher  levels  of 
transaction deposits as less risky and channeled large inflows of funds toward them. These banks 
were, therefore, able to gather and reallocate the scarce liquidity available in the market. This 
paper provides evidence that the increased reliance of banks on wholesale sources of funds, while 
reducing their dependence on retail deposits, increases their vulnerability to shocks to the money 
market, and reduces their ability to intermediate the remaining liquid funds. 
Finally, this paper also contributes to the literature on international contagion (Glick and Rose, 
1999;  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart,  2000;  Kaminsky  et  al.,  2003;  among  others),  by  providing 
evidence of a different channel through which financial turmoil may spread across countries. In 
addition to the common portfolio positions highlighted by the models following the Asian and 
Russian  crises  (Calvo,  1998;  Calvo  and  Mendoza,  2000;  Kaminsky  and  Reinhart,  2000; 
Kaminsky  and  Schmukler;  1999),  the  evidence  shows  that  the  development  of  international 
money markets may help spread financial malaise by globally spreading the impact of money 
market shocks. The contagion does not only come from a country-specific shock that propagates 
to countries financially linked to the affected one, but also from a common shock that affects 
those countries that are structurally exposed to it. Furthermore, the evidence in this paper is 
robust to the standard criticism that it is difficult to separate trade links and financial links at 
the aggregate level to determine the channels of contagion. This is because the identification 
comes mainly from within country differences in returns across banks, so it controls for country 
level differences in exposure through trade linkages. 7 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the recent evolution of the 
wholesale funds market, the main events of the financial crisis, and the evolution of the cost of 
liquidity during these episodes. Section 3 describes the empirical methodology and data sources. 
Sections  4  and  5  present  the  main  results  and  robustness  analysis,  respectively.  Section  6 
explores country characteristics and vulnerability to a liquidity crunch. Section 7 looks at the 
real consequences of the use of wholesale funds on banks’ lending activity. Finally, section 8 
concludes with some final remarks.  
2 Wholesale Funding Market, the Financial Crisis, and the Cost of Liquidity 
2.1 The wholesale funds market  
Banks have traditionally financed their operations with demand deposits, suggesting that the 
incentives that the threat of a run imposes on bank managers make them a superior form of 
financing despite their fragility (Diamond and Rajan, 2001). However, banks also rely on other 
types of markets for their funding needs: commercial paper, repo market, and  federal funds 
(interbank)  loans.  These  markets,  which  typically  offer  short-term  financing,  compose  the 
wholesale funding markets.  
The reliance of various types of intermediaries, particularly commercial banks, on these sources 
of funding has increased importantly in recent years in the US and around the world (Huang 
and Ratnovski, 2008; Feldman and Schmidt, 2001). For instance, the gross amount of deposits 
from foreign banks has increased from 6,240 to 13,856 billion US dollars between 2001 and 2006 
among the 41 countries surveyed by the Bank of International Settlements (BIS, 2008).  This 
increased reliance on wholesale funds can also be seen in bank-level data from Bankscope that 
show an increase in the use of wholesale sources of funds in the 5 years preceding the beginning 
of  the  2007-2008  financial  crisis.  Across  all  banks  located  in  the  44  countries  covered  by 
Bankscope that have an FTSE financial sector index (which will constitute this paper’s sample, 
as  explained  below),  the  average  fraction  of  liabilities  that  do  not  correspond  to  deposits 
increased  in around 60 percent between the end of 2001 and 2006. The increases are larger 
among commercial banks, reaching about 80 percent. This is shown in Figure 1, which plots the 
average fraction of liabilities not represented by deposits across all banks (Panel A) and all 
commercial banks (Panel B). The figure shows the average ratio as a fraction of the 2001 value, 
so that the ratio equals one in 2001 by construction, and the values in other years directly show 
the percentage increase with respect to the initial year. Beyond these global tendencies, the 8 
 
average fraction of non-deposit liabilities increased in 73 percent of the 44 countries described 
above, with an average increase of 38 percent between 2001 and 2006.  
Despite  the  potential  advantages  of  a  broad  base  of  funding,  and  the  apparent  fragility  of 
demand deposits, it has been recently recognized that wholesale funds are more volatile than 
demand  deposits—probably  because  they  are  typically  uninsured,  and  put  banks  at  risk  of 
liquidity dry-ups (Rajan, 2006), such as those occurring during the ongoing financial crisis. This 
has led some authors to suggest that the reliance of some banks on these sources of funds can 
explain the demise of some financial institutions and part of the crisis depth (Shin, 2008).  
2.2 A brief summary of the main events of the 2007-2008 financial crisis 
Although it is hard to date exactly the beginning of the ongoing financial crisis, there is some 
consensus  that  the  increase  in  defaults  on  loans  related  to  securitized  subprime  mortgages 
observed in early 2007 was the earliest indicator of the problems to come (Brunnermeier, 2009). 
The impact of these defaults was initially contained, so market participants started to become 
concerned with subprime defaults only by mid 2007. During July 2007, several events captured 
the  market’s  attention.  For  example,  Bear  Stearns  announced  that  two  of  its  hedge  funds 
specializing in subprime debt had lost more than 90 percent of its value; by the end of the 
month both funds filed for Chapter 15 bankruptcy. Also in July, Countrywide Financial (one of 
the largest mortgage originators in the US) announced that second quarter profits were down 33 
percent and warned about “difficult conditions”. 
The turmoil continued through the first days of August, when the German government bailed 
out IKB Deutsche Industriebank, and American Home Mortgage, the tenth largest US mortgage 
lender  in  2006,  filed  for  Chapter  11.  It  all  capped  on  August  9,  2007  when  BNP  Paribas, 
France’s biggest bank, froze assets on three investment funds that had capital of €1.6 billion and 
the ECB injected €95 billion into the Eurozone banking system. 
After the events in mid 2007, the financial crisis took center place in the economic discussion, 
financial markets became highly volatile, and authorities intervened in financial markets across 
the globe. The increase in global attention to the crisis can be easily seen in Figure 2. Panel A 
shows the monthly evolution of the number of  news stories published in the global English 
media containing the term “crisis” and either “financial”, “finance”, or “subprime” between 
January 2007 and July 2009, and Panel B displays the implied monthly growth rate in the 
number of news stories over the same period. The number of news stories related to the ongoing 9 
 
crisis shows clearly an increasing trend, with the first spike in the growth rate of news registered 
in August  2007,  when the number of news  stories was 80 percent higher than the previous 
month.  
Given the global nature of the crisis and the large number of financial institutions and countries 
affected, the two years elapsed since the beginning of the crisis have been unusually eventful, 
and hardly a day passes without some important development related to the crisis.
2 This can 
also be inferred from the evolution of news reported in Figure 2, which shows that the volume of 
news related to the crisis has been permanently high between 2007 and 2009, and, as of July 
2009, wass much larger than it was in the first half of 2007.  
Despite the fluidity of the situation, several discrete episodes have marked the course of events, 
especially in interbank liquidity markets. One of these episodes occurred on August 9, 2007, 
when as a result of the uncertainty about the exposure of financial institutions to “toxic assets”, 
liquidity quickly dried up. During this episode, the market for Asset Backed Commercial Paper 
(ABCP), the standard way in which mortgage securitizers financed their operations, practically 
disappeared, and the price of liquidity, measured as the TED spread, more than doubled in two 
days, from 44 bps on August 8 to 103 bps on August 10, 2007. These developments are apparent 
in Figure 3, which shows the evolution of the TED spread and the LIBOR-OIS spread.  
The most important of these episodes took place on September 15, 2008, immediately after the 
US government decided not to bail out the investment bank Lehman Brothers, and the long-
term debt of giant insurance company AIG was downgraded by all the major rating agencies, 
because of its exposure to Credit Default Swaps (CDS), inducing a 60 percent stock price decline 
for the day. The problems were so severe that this large insurance company had to be rescued 
by the US government on September 16, 2008. The increase in counterparty risk during this 
episode resulted in liquidity hoarding by financial institutions and large liquidity injections by 
the Fed and other central banks. This led the TED spread to historically unseen levels that 
thwarted the increase observed a year before, as Figure 3 shows.  
In addition to having a large de-facto impact on financial markets, the Lehman episode also 
captured a larger and sudden amount of attention from the international press, which indicates 
that, despite the persistent turmoil, it was largely unexpected. This effect can be seen in Panel 
                                                 
2 A comprehensive timeline, with more than 400 events, of the financial crisis is available at  
http://www.uiowa.edu/ifdebook/timeline/timeline1.shtml 10 
 
C of Figure 2, which shows on a daily basis similar information to panel A for the months 
surrounding this episode. There was a clear increase in the number of news stories related to the 
crisis immediately after this event (the day after). A similar, albeit smaller pattern is seen after 
the beginning of the liquidity crunch on August 9, 2007, mentioned above (Panel D). 
Clearly, despite the overall volatility in international liquidity markets, the September 15, 2008 
episode stands out because of its magnitude and fast onset. Based on these characteristics, this 
paper treats this episode as an “event”, and applies a standard event-study approach to test its 
international transmission. In what follows,  I will refer to the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy 
episode as the Lehman event (September 15, 2008). Although not the main focus of the paper, I 
will also look at the days following August 9, 2007 as an additional event of liquidity crunch to 
verify that a similar pattern is seen in the data.  
3 Methodology and Data 
The  impact  of  a  discrete  event  occurring  at  * t on  stock-price  returns  is  estimated  using  a 
regression version of a standard event study that allows the abnormal returns to differ across 
banks according to their ex-ante reliance on wholesale funding. To this end, the first step is to 
estimate  the  parameters  of  the  following  specification  during  a  period  of  1 T “normal”  days 
preceding the event, 
, , , , , , , 0 1 · , , i c t i c i c c t i c t R R t t t             (1) 
 where  *
01 t t t denote  the  beginning  and  end of  the  time  window  where  parameters  are 
estimated (the estimation window), and  ,, ict R is the stock-market return of bank i, from country 
c, between trading days t - 1 and t. In the preferred specification,  , ct R is a vector that contains 
the overall stock-market and banking industry return in country c at time t (two-factor model), 
but  I  also  estimate  a  one-factor  model  that  only  controls  for  the  stock-market  return  to 
characterize the evolution of the whole banking industry. The parameters  , ic  and  , ic   are bank 
specific coefficients to be estimated, and  ,, ict   is a random error.  
The abnormal returns of bank i from country c,  ,, ˆict  are computed as the deviation of the actual 
returns from those predicted by the model in equation (1) in a window of 2T + 1 days around 
the event (the event window),  11 
 
**
, , , , , , , ˆ ˆˆ, , . i c t i c t i c i c c t R R t t T t T               (2) 
If banks’ use of wholesale funds plays no role in the propagation of the events, the average 
abnormal returns of banks with high and low use of wholesale funds should not be significantly 
different  following  the  events.  This  hypothesis  can  be  formally  tested  by  estimating  the 
parameters of the following regression: 
*
* , , 0, 1, , , , ˆ ( · )· , t T c
i c t i c t i t tT W D v      
        (3) 
where  ,t D  is an event-time dummy that takes the value 1 when t    and zero otherwise, and 
0,   is the average abnormal return at event time   among all banks included in the regression. 
The variable  , ic W  measures bank i  wholesale dependence, which in the preferred specification is 
a continuous variable that is increasing in a bank’s use of wholesale funds (details below). The 
parameters  1,   are the key coefficients, since they are estimates of the average increase (or 
decrease) in abnormal returns at event-time   resulting from an increase in a bank’s wholesale 
dependence.  Under  the  hypothesis  that  banks’  wholesale  dependence  plays  no  role  in  the 
propagation of the events, the  1,   coefficients should not be significantly different from zero. In 
contrast, under the alternative that banks’ wholesale dependence helps to propagate the crisis, 
these coefficients should be significantly negative around or immediately after the event date, 
and the cumulative abnormal differential return (CADR), defined as  

1 1, 1 2 ˆ , [ , ] t
t t CADR t t   
     (4) 
should also decrease significantly immediately after the event. The focus of the paper is the 
estimation and characterization of the evolution of these coefficients during a 10 (trading) days 
windows following each of the two events under study.
3 
As mentioned above, the  0,   coefficients measure the average abnormal returns across banks at 
event time . These coefficients have a meaningful economic interpretation when the abnormal 
returns come from a one-factor model that only controls for market returns. In this case, they 
measure the average impact of the event on the banking sector at time   relative to the market, 
                                                 
3 The event study literature typically privileges the analysis of cumulative returns because the cumulative 
impact of the events is easier to visualize. The rest of the paper follows this convention, but also reports 
the individual  1,   on occasion. 12 
 
and can be used to test whether an event has a significant impact on the banking industry as a 
whole. The first set of results reported in section 4 will come from this simple model to establish 
that there is an event affecting the banking industry in the selected dates, before turning to test 
whether the events have a differential effect across banks. The two-factor model, the preferred 
one,  already  controls  for  the  returns  of  the  banking  industry  FTSE  index,  so,  the  0,   
coefficients only capture random differences between the banks in the sample and in the index, 
thus, the two-factor model only provides a test for differential effects across banks.  
To further control for any country-level effect of the events not captured by the FTSE bank 
index, the preferred specification permits the  0, 
 
coefficients to vary across countries. This 
further ensures that the identification of the  1, 
 
coefficients comes exclusively from within-
country,  across-banks  differences  in  abnormal  returns  and  provides  a  sharp  test  of  the 
hypothesis that bank’s use of wholesale funds is driving the impact of the events. The final, 
preferred specification, therefore, corresponds to 
*
* , , 0, , 1, , , , ˆ )· (, t T c
i c t c i c t i t tT W D v      
        (5) 
where  0, ,c    measures the countryc’s average abnormal return at time . Nevertheless, I will 
also report results for the simpler specification in equation (3) to show the role of cross-country 
differences.  
Beyond  the  baseline  specification,  additional  regressions  will  control  for  the  possibility  that 
other bank characteristics may drive any differential effect of the event among banks with high 
and low wholesale dependence by estimating the following abnormal return model:  
*
* , , 0, , 1, , , 2, , , ( )· , ˆ t T c
i c t c i c i c t i t tT W X D v         
          (6) 
where  the  vector  , ic X   includes  several  bank  characteristics  that  may  be  related  to  its 
vulnerability to the crisis such as size, leverage, ownership, and type of bank, which may be also 
interacted with wholesale dependence.  
I estimate the parameters of equation (1) using a window of 180 calendar days before June 30, 
2007  (the  normal  times),  and  a  window  of  10  days  before  and  after  each  event  for  the 13 
 
parameters of equations (3), (5), and (6).
4 Returns are measured as “lumped” returns,
5 but since 
some banks are not traded on every trading date, especially in developing countries, results 
using  returns  computed  from  consecutive  trading  days,  so  called  trade-to-trade  returns  (see 
Maynes and Rumsey, 1993), are also reported in the Appendix. Observations with daily returns 
larger than 100 percent in absolute value are dropped from the data because they are assumed 
to  be  either  erroneous  or  to  capture  the  impact  of  other  corporate  event  that  cannot  be 
controlled for.
6 All parameters are estimated using OLS and correcting the standard errors for 
heteroskedasticity  to  ease  concerns  of  changes  in  post-event  volatility.  However,  in  the 
specifications that focus on the   0, 
 
coefficients (i.e. those not including the  , ic W  variable), the 
standard  errors  are  estimated  using  only  the  time  variation  of  the  data  to  account  for  the 
clustering of events in time (see Campbell et al. 1997).  
The last part of the paper studies whether the differential impact of the liquidity crunch on 
banks with different reliance on wholesale funding—captured by the 1,  , depends on the ability 
of a bank’s country to secure retail deposits, the transparency of the country’s financial system, 
or it’s degree of international integration. To test for this additional differential effect I allow 
the  1,   coefficients to depend on these characteristics as follows: 
1, 1, 2, , c
c F            (9) 
where  c F  contains measures of the relevant country characteristics.  
The main measure of a bank’s reliance on wholesale funding is the ratio of total retail deposits 
(total deposits minus bank deposits) to total liabilities, RDEPLIAB. A high value of this ratio 
indicates that a bank finances a small fraction of its liabilities with wholesale funds, so I use the 
following transformation: 
  ,, log(1 ), i c i c W RDEPLIAB     
                                                 
4 Robustness checks in the appendix present results for different estimation and event windows, including 
results obtained estimating the parameters of the preferred equation (5) using data from just before each 
event, as in a standard event study. 
5 This means that during periods of inactivity all returns are assigned to the first day in which there is 
new activity. 
6 The large number of banks in the sample and the length of the window makes including dummies for 
individual corporate events unfeasible.  14 
 
where  a  high  value  of  , ic W   represents  high  use  of  wholesale  funds.  This  logarithmic 
transformation  also  reduces  the  role  of  outliers  and  is  valid  for  banks  with  no  deposits.
7   
Alternatively, I also use other measures of a bank’s dependence on wholesale funds, such as the 
ratio of total deposits to liabilities, total retail deposits to total loans, and money market funds 
to liabilities to check the robustness of the results. 
Balance  sheet  information  for  the  different  measures  comes  from  the  latest  balance  sheet 
available before June 30, 2007, of all listed banks reporting to Bankscope. Data on stock market 
returns  of  listed  banks  included  in  Bankscope  come  from  Bloomberg.  Stock  market  returns 
correspond to  the percentage  change in closing price between two consecutive trading days. 
Only banks from countries with an available FTSE banking industry index were considered. 
This ensures that countries included are actively part of the international financial system, and 
that the regressions can control for industry wide effects (industry factor).
8 For each country in 
the  sample,  the  market  and  banking  industry  returns  are  the  corresponding  FTSE  indexes 
obtained from Datastream. Finally, data on country level characteristics, such as exposure to 
US  ABS,  trade  linkages,  fraction  of  US  external  assets,  coverage  of  deposit  insurance  and 
financial system transparency are obtained from various sources detailed in the Appendix.  
The  final  sample  of  banks  with  data  on  the  main  measure  of  wholesale  fund  dependence 
comprises 662 banks in 44 countries excluding the US. It covers all geographical areas, although 
most countries belong to Western Europe or East Asia and Pacific (14 and 11, respectively), 
followed by Latin America, East and Central Asia, Middle East and North Africa, South Asia,  
North  America,  and  Sub-Saharan  Africa  (6,  6,  3,  2,  1,  and  1  countries,  respectively).  For 
obvious reasons, most countries are either high or middle-income (24 and 18, respectively), but 
two low-income countries are also represented (India and Pakistan). The geographic and income 
distribution of the sample varies slightly at the bank level. East Asia and Pacific overtakes 
Western Europe,  with  234  and  231  banks,  respectively;  South Asia  surpasses  the remaining 
                                                 
7 Alternatively one could use  log(1 ) RDEPLIAB  , the log of the fraction of non-deposit liabilities. The 
only inconvenience of this measure is that since deposits are typically a large fraction of liabilities, it is 
more  negatively  skewed  than  the  measure  defined  above.  Nonetheless,  results  obtained  with  both 
measures are virtually identical.  
8 FTSE indexes include only countries that allow investment by foreign nationals and repatriation of 
funds.  This  ensures  that  countries  included  are  part  of  the  global  liquidity  market.  In  addition,  the 
construction of the indexes relies on having banks of appropriate size, capitalization, and liquidity. For 
further details, see FTSE (2006). 15 
 
regions, with 70 banks, and the overall participation of low-income countries increases from 4 
percent to 10 percent of the sample. Because of differences in the coverage of different variables, 
the final samples vary with the specific measure used, but the results are robust to considering 
only the sample that is common to all measures.  
The detailed list of countries in the sample, some summary statistics, and the average wholesale 
dependence of each country are reported in Table 1. In addition to the overall increase in the 
use  of  wholesale  funds  documented  in  the  previous  section,  the  table  shows  that  there  is 
important heterogeneity in this use across countries. The overall mean in the ratio of retail 
deposits to liabilities is 0.61 with a standard deviation of 0.31 and an interquartile range of 0.46 
(Panel B). Not surprisingly, the ratio is higher in commercial banks than in investment banks, 
and is also larger in public banks than in foreign banks. Moreover, there is an important degree 
of variation within country. In fact, 74 percent of the standard deviation reported above comes 
from within country, and only 26 percent from between countries. Therefore, the data exhibit 
enough within-country variation for the identification strategy of this paper that, as previously 
discussed, largely relies on within country comparisons. Finally, Panel C shows that, within a 
country,  the  measure  of  wholesale  dependence  , ic W   is  positively  correlated  with  leverage, 
negatively correlated with size (log assets), and negatively correlated with the ratio of liquid 
assets to liabilities. 
4 Results 
The  abnormal  returns  from  a  one-factor model  provide  an  estimate  of  the  evolution  of  the 
average  CAR  of  the  worldwide  banking  sector  during  the  Lehman  event.  These  results  are 
reported in Figure 4. There is a sharp decline in the abnormal returns of banks immediately 
after the  day  of the  event  (Panel  A)  and  the magnitude  of  the  decline  in  returns is  large, 
reaching 2.9 percent three days after the event (respect to the day before the event), even after 
controlling for market returns. This corresponds to a 93 percent loss on an annual basis.
9  
Although  banks  worldwide  experienced  significantly  negative  abnormal  returns  immediately 
after Lehman, they were performing slightly better than the market before the event. To control 
for  this  pre-event  trend,  I  compare  the  banks’  abnormal  returns  after  the  event  with  their 
average before the event. Finding that banks performed significantly worse after the event, even 
                                                 
9 This is the multiplicative loss using the average daily decline of 36.5 basis points. It is smaller than the 
additive loss, which is 133 percent. 16 
 
after controlling for their pre-event abnormal returns, would provide strong evidence that the 
events affected banks’ performance. This is indeed the case, as shown in Panel B, which plots 
the cumulative abnormal return of banks relative to their average pre-event abnormal returns. 
For instance, the average daily abnormal return of banks during the 10 trading days preceding 
September 15, 2008 was 10 bps: banks were doing relatively better before the event. However, 
immediately after the event these differences increased in a statistically significant manner: the 
average abnormal returns were -93 and -63 bps the two days following the event, respectively, 
103 and 79 35 basis points lower than before  the event. The figure in Panels B shows the 
cumulative  pattern  of  these  differences.  Three  days  after  the  Lehman  event  the  cumulative 
abnormal differential returns reached 327 basis points. Therefore, the evidence shows that banks 
did relatively worse respect to the market immediately after the event.  
If  banks’  use  of  wholesale  sources  of  funds  is  a  transmission  mechanism  for  the  liquidity 
crunches  observed  during  the  recent  crisis,  the  significant  return  decline  documented  above 
should be larger for banks that are more dependent on these sources of funds. This hypothesis is 
formally tested by estimating the parameters of equation (3). Figure 5 reports the resulting 
CAR for a bank with wholesale dependence at the 25th and 75th sample percentile levels (42 
and 87 percent respectively corresponding to a log difference of 0.28) and the difference in CAR 
between them.  
The results in Figure 5 clearly show that a bank at the 75th percentile of wholesale dependence 
experiences a significantly larger stock price decline than a bank at the 25th percentile (3.4 
percent larger three days after the event, see Panels A and B). This differential effect is large 
not only in absolute value, but also when compared to the 2.9 percent average banking sector 
decline documented above. Moreover, two-thirds of the cumulative return decline takes place 
immediately after the event. In fact, the difference in abnormal returns between banks with high 
and low wholesale dependence is significantly larger at the 5 percent level (in absolute value) 
immediately  after  Lehman  than  before  it.  Even  compared  to  their  bad  pre-event  relative 
performance, high wholesale dependence banks experienced a statistically significant 1.2 percent 
abnormal return decline three days after the event, of which 40 bps occur at the event day 
(Panel C). This magnitude is large in absolute terms and also compared to the 3.3 percent 
decline  relative  to  pre-event  trend  documented  for  the  whole  banking  sector  in  Panel  B  of 
Figure 4.  
The previous results come from a one-factor model that only controls for market returns. This 
simple model has the advantage of permitting the interpretation of the  0,   coefficients as the 17 
 
average abnormal returns of the whole banking sector  relative to  the market, but does not 
control  for  the  overall  banking  sector  performance  when  computing  the  differential  returns 
(CADR). Therefore, it is possible that country level differences in bank sector performance drive 
the results. This may still be consistent with the hypothesis of liquidity driven transmission, but 
properly testing the hypothesis at this level would require controlling for other cross-country 
sources of return differences, which is beyond the scope of this paper. To test whether the 
results  are  fully  driven  by  cross-country  differences,  the  exercises  reported  in  Figure  6  use 
abnormal returns obtained from a two-factor model and also focus on within-country return 
differentials across banks, fully controlling for cross-country differences in the response of banks 
to  the  event  in  a  non-parametric  way  by  including  country-event-time  fixed  effects  in  the 
estimation  (see  Eq.  [5]).  The  identification  of  the  CADR  comes,  therefore,  exclusively  from 
within-country and event time differences in abnormal returns across banks. This is the most 
flexible specification possible, and, as mentioned in section 3 corresponds to the preferred model. 
The point estimates of the differential returns  1, ˆ
t  , and the corresponding CADR are reported in 
Panel C. Henceforth, all reported differential returns and CADR will come from this baseline 
specification unless stated otherwise.
10  
Again, the results are qualitatively similar to those previously reported, but the pre-event trend 
is much less marked than in Figure 5 and the magnitude and significance of the CADR decline 
increase respect to that figure (1.6 percent three days after the event, statistically significant 
since the event day). Controlling for the pre-event difference in abnormal returns yields similar 
qualitative findings, although the magnitude and significance of the CADR is smaller than in 
Panel A, as expected. 
A further check of the relevance of the mechanism is provided by looking at the differential 
response of wholesale dependent banks to the smaller liquidity crunch observed on August 9, 
2007. As mentioned above, this day marks the beginning of the turmoil in interbank markets 
and the quick disappearance of the ABCP market, although the raise in both the TED spread 
and the LIBOR-OIS spread were smaller than following Lehman. Panel A of Figure 7 shows 
that, as in the case of Lehman, the overall banking sector experienced a decline relative to the 
market following this event, even after controlling for the pre-event trend. Also similarly to the 
Lehman event, the results show that the CADR of banks with higher wholesale dependence 
experienced  a  relative  decline,  although  the  magnitude  of  the  decline  is  smaller  than  after 
                                                 
10 Results including a second factor measuring the country level performance of the banking industry, or adding a 
country fixed effect are qualitatively and quantitatively similar.  18 
 
Lehman, reaching only a 0.6 percent five days after the event, and not statistically significant 
(Panel B.1). This changes slightly when removing the pre-trend differences in CAR between 
banks with high and low wholesale dependence, with the relative CADR becoming significant at 
the 10 percent level the day of the event ( 0 t  ) and two days later (Panel B.2). Notice also, 
that  despite  its  smaller  magnitude,  the  stock  price  decline  of  banks  with  high  wholesale 
dependence is about one third of the average bank decline reported in Panel A, which is similar 
to that obtained for Lehman. The similar, albeit weaker, pattern observed after this smaller 
liquidity crunch provides further support to the hypothesis that the transmission of the Lehman 
event across banks was indeed related to their wholesale dependence, but also suggests that 
other factors may be at play during the earlier stages of the crisis.  
The weaker evidence on the role of wholesale dependence on international transmission in the 
August 2007 episode is probably related to three factors. First, the liquidity crunch in August 
2007  was  smaller  and  slower  than  in  the  second  half  of  September  2008  (only  0.4  percent 
increase  in  the  TED  spread  three  days  after  the  event,  compared  to  1.6  percent  during 
Lehman).  Second,  the  August  2007  liquidity  crunch  affected  a  segment  of  wholesale  funds 
(ABCP) that were heavily used by some financial institutions (SVP and conduits) linked to 
banks, but less so for commercial banks themselves. This may have delayed the response of bank 
returns  to  the  shock  to  the  ABCP  market  until  market  participants  fully  realized  the 
connections between conduits and banks and the former had to tap into the credit guaranteed 
offered by the latter. In contrast, following the Lehman episode, the complete interbank market 
came to a standstill in a situation where alternative sources of funding, such as ABCPs had 
already dried. Third, the August 2007 episode occurred at the beginning of the crisis, when still 
most analysts and publications referred to the turbulences as the “subprime crisis” and the 
extent  of  contagion  to  other  financial  segments  was  still  unclear.  Thus,  the  transmission 
mechanism at that stage of the crisis was probably more closely linked to the exposure of banks 
to “toxic” assets than to their reliance on international liquidity markets. 
Taking  stock,  the  results  clearly  show  that  banks  worldwide  experienced  a  large  abnormal 
return decline following Lehman, and that this decline was much more pronounced for banks 
that relied more heavily on wholesale sources of funds. Also, to a lesser extent, there is a similar 
pattern  following  the  smaller  freeze  of  liquidity  markets  on  August  9,  2007.  These  findings 
strongly suggest that the increasing reliance of banks worldwide on wholesale sources of funds 
played  an  important  role  in  the  international  transmission  of  financial  distress  in  the  days 
following the demise of Lehman Brothers, when international interbank liquidity markets dried 19 
 
up, and after other liquidity crunch episodes. The rest of the paper will show that these findings 
are not driven by particular model choices or alternative explanations. 
5 Robustness 
This section explores in detail the robustness of the findings to changes in the event dates and 
to  controlling  for  other  bank  level  characteristics  associated  with  potentially  different 
transmission channels. Standard robustness checks to changes in the estimates of the abnormal 
returns, the measures of wholesale dependence, the sample of countries and banks, and the event 
and estimation windows are reported in the Appendix. 
5.1 Changes in the event dates 
An alternative interpretation of the findings is that the returns of banks with high wholesale 
dependence are more responsive to turmoil. For instance, these banks may be more opaque and 
tend to over-react to bad news.  To check for this possibility I repeated the event study at dates 
at which the main events did not coincide with a liquidity crunch, that is, when there was no 
clear  spike  of  the  TED  spread:  the  collapse  of  Bear  Stearns  on  March  14,  2008,  and  the 
announcement of the bailout plan by the US government on October 2, 2008. Figure 8 reports 
the evolution of the cumulative differential returns  1,   in these two episodes. It clearly shows 
that there is no obvious differential return response of banks with high wholesale dependence in 
any direction (positive or negative) in each of these episodes. None of the estimated differential 
abnormal returns is statistically different from zero in the days immediately after the event. In 
the Bear Stearns’ collapse, the only significant differential return occurs eight days after the 
event, and in the case of the bailout, it occurs 10 days after. This shows that the immediate 
decline in returns observed during the Lehman episode, and to a lesser extent after August 9, 
2007, is neither a usual pattern of the data nor the response of these banks to any turmoil 
episode.  
5.2 Controlling for other bank characteristics and transmission channels 
Although the baseline results are robust to standard checks, it may be the case that banks with 
high and low dependence on wholesale funds are systematically different in other characteristics 
that are the true determinants of their differential response, and relate to different transmission 
mechanisms.  To  discard  this  possibility,  I  sequentially  added  to  , ic X   several  bank  level 
characteristics that could be behind the differential response of banks to Lehman, as described 20 
 
in equation (6). In particular, the results reported below control for bank leverage, size, asset 
composition,  direct  exposure  to  Lehman,  ownership  (domestic/foreign),  and  type  of  bank 
(commercial, investment, or other).  
There has recently been a lot of attention devoted to the role of leverage in the amplification of 
the ongoing financial crisis, especially the leverage of financial institutions that act as market 
makers (Adrian and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009). A high leverage implies that the capital 
cushion available to absorb losses on asset values is small. The larger the initial leverage, the 
larger the increase in leverage resulting from a loss, and the larger the need for adjustment. 
Hence, it is possible that the different crisis episodes affected significantly more those banks with 
higher leverage than less leveraged institutions. However, controlling for the leverage of banks 
does not significantly change the findings during the Lehman event. Panel A.1 of Figure 9 shows 
that the decline in CADR for banks with high wholesale dependence is similar to that obtained 
without controlling for leverage, and Panel A.2 shows that banks with higher leverage do not 
show a significantly larger change in returns.  
Larger banks may have better access to non-deposit sources of funds like certificates of deposits 
(CDs), as shown by Kashyap and Stein (1995), or just have better access to external funds 
(Gertler  and  Gilchrist,  1993).  In  fact,  Panel  B.2  of  Figure  9  shows  that  larger  banks  did 
relatively better during the Lehman episode, with a marginally significant CADR of about 2 
percent (p-value of 0.13). Nevertheless, this does not affect the differential response of banks 
with higher wholesale dependence, which are still significantly more affected by the event than 
their country peers. 
A sudden rise in the cost of external liquidity may make internal liquidity more valuable. Thus, 
banks with a higher fraction of liquid assets may be less significantly affected by the Lehman 
event. The results reported in Panel C control for this possibility by adding the (log) ratio of 
liquid  assets  to  total  assets  to  the  baseline  specification.  Contrary  to  expectations,  the 
availability of liquid assets does not have any consequence for the impact of the Lehman event 
on banks. As before, the results for wholesale dependence remain unaffected. Similar results are 
obtained for other measures of asset composition such as the fraction of securities and the ratio 
of non-performing loans (not reported).
11 
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dampen the role of wholesale dependence. I formally tested for this possibility by adding the interaction 21 
 
Banks that belong to multinational corporations may have better access to credit lines from 
their parent companies and, thus, be less affected by liquidity contractions. In fact, Arena et al. 
(2006) find some evidence that foreign banks are less affected by monetary conditions than their 
peers. State owned banks may also be less affected by crisis, because they count with an implicit 
(or explicit) government guarantee. Thus, if bank ownership is an important determinant of the 
response to the current crisis, and correlates with a bank’s wholesale dependence, the differential 
returns documented above may not indicate the existence of liquidity related transmission. The 
results  reported  in  Figure  10  control  for  this  possibility  by  adding  a  dummy  variable  that 
indicates if  a  bank  has  some  foreign  or  state ownership,  using  information  from  Micco  and 
Panizza (2006), at the cost of importantly reducing the sample to 586 banks. The results show 
that foreign owned banks do relatively better and state owned banks relatively worse during the 
Lehman  episode,  although  the  CADR  of  state  banks  after  the  episode  are  not  statistically 
significant, and those of foreign owned banks only marginally two days after the event. Also, 
controlling  for  ownership  does  not  change  the  relative  decline  in  returns  for  banks  more 
dependent on wholesale funds, but it reduces the significance of the CADR because of the large 
decline in sample size. 
The failure of Lehman Brothers not only resulted in a large liquidity crunch with a sudden dry 
up of interbank loan markets, but also resulted in potential losses for banks that were directly 
exposed to this institution. The results reported in Panel C add a dummy that takes the value 
of one for banks that declared exposure to Lehman in the weeks following its collapse to the 
baseline specification to control for the possibility that the measure of wholesale dependence 
may  be  capturing  direct  exposure  to  Lehman, and,  therefore,  counterparty  risk  rather  than 
wholesale liquidity dependence. The data for the construction of the dummy variable come from 
the Daily List of Companies Reporting Lehman Bros Exposure published by Dow Jones News 
services between September 15 and October 15, 2008. I use a dummy variable as a control 
because the data on the size of the exposure is not comprehensive. The results show indeed that 
banks that were directly exposed to Lehman suffered a large relative decline in their returns, of 
about  one  percentage  point  in  a  single  day.  Nonetheless,  the  CADR  for  banks  with  high 
liquidity dependence are still negative, significant, and of similar magnitude as in the baseline. 
                                                                                                                                                             
between wholesale dependence and the measures of leverage, size, and asset composition to the baseline 
specification. The results (not reported) only show a significant differential effect of wholesale dependence 
among larger banks, which probably reflects the higher reliance of these banks on international and more 
volatile sources of wholesale funds. 22 
 
This shows that direct exposure to the failing institution is not behind the baseline results, but 
it is the indirect effect of the liquidity crunch that drives them.
12 
The analysis so far pooled all types of banks together, regardless of their type, but different 
types of banks use wholesale funds to different extents, and it is possible that these differences 
cause the differential effect of the Lehman episode documented above. In Figure 11, I investigate 
this  possibility  by  separately  estimating  the  baseline  model  for  different  types  of  banks: 
investment banks, commercial banks, and the rest.  The results show no CADR between those 
investment banks with high and low wholesale dependence (Panel A.2). In contrast, for both 
commercial and other types of banks the CADR of banks with high wholesale dependence are 
significantly negative (statistically and economically, panels B.2 and C.2). This does not mean 
that the event has no impact on investment banks. To show this, the figures in panels A.1, B.1, 
and C.1 display the average impact of the event in each type of banks (akin to that reported in 
Figure 4 for the whole banking system). They show that, while average abnormal returns decline 
for all types of banks the day of the event, investment banks (those with a higher average 
wholesale dependence) experienced a much more pronounced decline, reaching about 5 percent. 
The baseline results, therefore, do not seem to be driven by a single type of bank, but by the 
composition of differences within and across bank types: investment banks experience a large 
average abnormal return decline, commercial and other types of banks do not experience an 
overall decline, but those banks with high dependence in these categories do.  
6 Country Characteristics and Vulnerability to a Liquidity Crunch 
The previous results assumed that, after controlling for a country’s banks average abnormal 
return at each moment, the response of banks with a given level of wholesale dependence was 
constant across countries. However, some country characteristics may attenuate or amplify the 
impact of a liquidity crunch on wholesale dependent banks. The results of this section explore 
several of these possibilities: the role of deposit insurance, the level of international reserves, the 
quality of financial regulation, and the degree of financial integration. In doing so, they help to 
shed some extra light on the mechanism behind the international transmission of the crisis.  
Broad deposit insurance may reduce the risk of a depositor run and reduce the cost of retail 
deposits, and a high level of international reserves may allow the government to credibly bail 
                                                 
12 Using all three-bank characteristics (leverage, size, and declared exposure to Lehman Brothers) together 
does not change the results. 23 
 
out banks in trouble. Panel A of Figure 12 compares the CADR of banks with high wholesale 
dependence  in  countries  with  deposit insurance  coverage  below  and  above  the  cross-country 
median (corresponding to coverage of 2.54 of GDP per capita). It shows that high wholesale 
dependence banks operating in countries with higher deposit insurance coverage experienced a 
relatively smaller decline in abnormal returns following the Lehman event. The difference in 
CADR  is  economically  large  (3  percent  during  the  three  days  following  the  event)  and 
statistically significant the third day after the event (September 18, 2008).  Thus, the safety net 
provided by the insurance seems to have reduced the transmission of the shock. 
A vast amount of international reserves may help a country to withstand reversals in capital 
flows (Aizenman and Marion, 2003; Stiglitz, 2006). Thus, banks dependent on wholesale funds 
may be less vulnerable to sharp liquidity shocks when located in countries with deep pockets of 
reserves that can be used to provide liquidity to the banking sector on short notice. This is what 
the results in Panel B show: the CADR of high wholesale dependence banks declines much more 
in countries with relatively low levels of reserves (international reserves as a fraction of financial 
system assets below the cross-country median). The cumulative decline in abnormal returns of 
high wholesale dependence banks during the three days following Lehman is about two percent 
in a country with low reserves, and 0.36 percent in a country with high reserves. However, the 
differential effect is not statistically significant at conventional levels. There is some evidence, 
therefore, that the buffer provided by reserves also seems to reduce international transmission. 
The  quality  of  financial  regulation  may  also  act  as  a  buffer  against  the  international 
transmission of shocks. In addition, banks in countries with better regulatory systems may have 
followed stronger prudential guidelines for any composition of its balance sheet. The figures in 
panels C.1 and C.2 show the CADR for countries with an index of financial regulation below 
and above the median. Regulation is a muti-dimensional concept, which I capture with a rough 
index of the power of the supervisor (from Barth et al., 2005). A higher index indicates higher 
power of the supervisor. As in the previous cases, the point estimates indicate that banks with 
high  wholesale  dependence  suffer  less  in  countries  with  better  regulation,  although  the 
differential response is not statistically significant at conventional levels. 
Despite the overall increase in banks’ use of international wholesale markets, there is substantial 
heterogeneity in the use of these sources of funds across countries. While a worldwide increase in 
the cost of liquidity will likely increase its domestic cost even in countries with a relatively 
autarkic banking sector, it would occur through indirect channels, and one would expect a larger 
impact on wholesale dependent banks located in countries where a larger share of such wholesale 24 
 
funds  comes  directly  from  abroad.  The  results  reported  in  Panel  A  of  Figure  13  allow  the 
differential effect  of the  event to  depend  on  a  country’s  degree  of  capital  account  openness 
(captured  by  the  Ito  and  Chinn,  2008  index).  Wholesale  dependent  banks  located  in  more 
financially open countries experience a similar decline than those in less open countries. Only 
four days after the Lehman event (September 19) there is a significantly larger relative decline 
in more open countries.  
A possible explanation for this lack of relevance of capital account openness in the transmission 
of the crisis is that the relevant measure of openness should more directly capture the exposure 
of the banking sector to international sources of wholesale funds. Since there are no bank level 
data on the use of international funds, I rely instead on data from the Bank of International 
Settlements (BIS) on the external deposits and loans of banks in a country vis-à-vis the foreign 
bank and non-bank sector. The evidence, shown in panels B.1 and B.2, supports this idea. The 
CADR of high wholesale dependence banks in countries with external loans as a fraction of total 
bank assets below the cross-country median is much smaller than that of countries above the 
median.  The  exposure  of  the  banking  sector  seems  to  matter.    Overall,  it  seems  that  the 
liquidity crunch was particularly important for banks with high wholesale dependence located in 
countries  with  good  banking  sector  integration.  This  further  supports  the  role  of  wholesale 
dependence as a source of vulnerability that contributes to the transmission of money market 
shocks. 
7 Are there real consequences? 
The results reported so far show that the stock price of banks with higher wholesale dependence 
declined significantly more than that of their country peers with lower wholesale dependence, 
suggesting that the use of wholesale funds helped to propagate the crisis across countries. The 
main advantage of looking at stock prices in an eventful period such as the 2007/2008 crisis is 
that  this approach focuses  on high frequency responses and isolates the impact  of an event 
within a narrow window where one can safely assume that the event is the main news. Studying 
lower frequency data runs the risk of confounding the impact of the events with the policy 
responses they triggered such as the massive interventions by the Federal Reserve, the ECB, or 
the US and other governments. The main disadvantage of this approach is that it only shows 
the impact of the events on the financial value of banks but not the second round impact it has 
on the real economy. It is thus possible to wonder whether the mechanism reported here matters 
for real production decisions. The regressions reported in Table 2 explore the consequences of 25 
 
the  value  decline  of  banks  with  higher  wholesale  dependence  on  their  lending  activity  by 
estimating parameters of the following two simple specifications 
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where  Loans   represents  either  the  level  of  loans  or  the  ratio  of  loans  to  assets. 
, , 1, 1 () i c t t Change Loans   is the average monthly change in the level of loans,  , , 1, 1 () i c t t Growth Loans   
is the average monthly growth rate of loans of bank  i  from country  c at between the last 
balance  sheet  reported  before  Lehman  ( 1 t  )  and  immediately  after  Lehman  ( 1 t  ), 
, , 1 i c t Loans    and  , , 1 log( ) i c t Loans    are  the  level  and  the  log  of  initial  loans  (to  capture 
convergence  effects),  , ic W   is  the  wholesale  dependence  of  the  bank,  as  defined  above,  and 
, , 1 i c t size   is the log assets of the bank immediately before the Lehman event. The parameters to 
be  estimated  are  c  (country  fixed  effects),   ,  and   .  If  banks  with  higher  wholesale 
dependence  do  not  only  suffer  a  temporary  decline  in  value,  but  also  contract  their  loans 
relatively more, the parameter   should be negative and statistically significant. 
The results indicate that in all cases, banks with higher wholesale dependence reduced loans by 
more than banks with lower dependence, and except for the specification focusing on the growth 
of the loan to asset ratio (Column 3), the coefficient   is statistically significant at conventional 
levels. Moreover, the magnitudes are meaningful: an increase in wholesale dependence equal to 
its interquartile change (0.287) would be associated with a decline in the monthly growth rate of 
loans of 0.7 percent (equivalent to a 8.5% annual). With the caveat that these are reduced form 
regressions, the correlations reported here are consistent with the mechanism of transmission 
through wholesale funds having meaningful real consequences. 
8 Conclusion 
The turmoil in the US subprime market quickly propagated across countries and asset classes, 
taking down large financial institutions across the world, and even jeopardizing whole financial 
systems. The speed and scope of propagation suggests that financial linkages were at the center 
of the transmission of shocks. Modern financial systems are interconnected in many complex 
ways that can help propagate and amplify shocks to any of its components. This paper focuses 
on one specific dimension of financial connections, the worldwide reliance of banks on global 
liquidity markets, and provides evidence that it played a quantitatively important role in the 
transmission of the crisis, especially in the critical days following the bankruptcy of Lehman 26 
 
Brothers. In doing so, it highlights another dimension of the typical trade-offs between efficiency 
and vulnerability involved in financial integration, but one that relates to the vulnerability of 
the banking sector, which plays a key role in the normal functioning of an economy. 
From a policy perspective, some of the results suggest that the presence of a good regulatory 
framework,  deposit  insurance  schemes,  and  an  appropriate  level  of  reserves  may  reduce  the 
importance of the sources of bank financing for the transmission of a liquidity crunch. However, 
this paper has not provided evidence that these policies also reduce the average effect of a 
crunch on a country’s banking sector as a whole, so their dampening role has to be taken with 
caution. 
Some  of  the  documented  impacts  are  short  lived,  but  this  is  arguably  due  to  the  massive 
liquidity injections conducted on short notice by central banks across the world, especially in 
Europe  and  the  US.  Considering  the  magnitude  of  these  interventions,  finding  significant 
differential return responses, such as those documented in this paper, is strong evidence of the 
vulnerability resulting from banks’ reliance on non-deposit sources of funds. On the other hand, 
it is also evidence that an aggressive use of the lender (and liquidity provider) of last resort role 
of central banks can reduce the adverse consequences of this vulnerability, while maintaining the 
benefits for banks of diversifying the sources of funds. Nevertheless, the paper also provided 
evidence  that  the  vulnerability  resulting  from  the  use  of  wholesale  dependence  had  real 
consequences for banks’ lending activity. 
The  results  also  suggest  that  further  thought  is  required  on  the  relative  safety  of  different 
sources of banks’ funds. While demand deposits have historically being considered risky and 
have received government insurance, other sources of funds have not. Yet, during this crisis, 
their systemic nature became apparent and governments had to extend protection to them too. 
Thus, money market lenders enjoyed higher interest rates than depositors during normal times, 
and ended up being equally protected during crises. Making the protection explicit, or clearly 
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Appendix 
A. Fit of one and two-factor models 
Appendix Table 2 summarizes the results obtained from the estimation of equation (1) for each 
bank in the sample. The model typically has a good fit, with an average R
2 of 0.3. The average 
  is 0.51 and 8 percent of the estimated   coefficients are significant at the 10 percent level. 
There is more variation in the estimated . The average market beta  m   equals 0.44 with a 
standard deviation of 0.58, and a 52 percent of significant parameters. In the case of the sector 
beta,  b  , the average is 0.29, the standard deviation is 0.52, and the fraction of significant 
parameters is 0.48. Overall, the return model has good explanatory power. 
B. Further robustness tests 
B.1 Changes in the measures of abnormal returns and wholesale dependence 
Standard event studies typically estimate the parameters of the model ( ’s and ’s) using data 
from immediately before the event, assuming that the event under study is the only significant 
disturbance to returns during the period. In contrast, the baseline results of this paper come 
from  parameters  estimated  long  before  the  event,  because  despite  the  time  gap,  those 
observations  are  more  likely  to  capture  accurately  the  statistical  relations  among  variables 
during normal times. Nevertheless, I also constructed the abnormal returns using parameters 
estimated immediately before the event window to check for the relevance of this choice for the 
main  findings  of  the  paper.  Panel  A  of  Appendix  Figure  1  reports  the  results,  which  are 
qualitatively and quantitatively similar to the baseline, although the decline in CADR is slightly 
smaller (reaching 2 percent three days after the event) and the statistical significance of the 
results is marginally reduced.  
Including only countries with FTSE banking sector indexes in the sample ensures that in each 
country  there  are  at  least  some  banks  with  non-trivial  market  capitalization  and  shares’ 
turnover.  However,  not  all  the  banks  included  trade  frequently,  especially  during  turbulent 
times. Since the calculation of the stock market returns used in the baseline estimations did not 
correct for thinly traded stocks, the parameters may be biased, and the abnormal returns may 
exhibit excessive volatility. The reason is that standard “lumped” returns attribute all price 
changes to the first trading period after a spell of no trading, resulting in abnormally large 32 
 
returns the day of the trade. To address this problem, I re-estimated the parameters of the 
baseline model, as well as the abnormal returns, using trade-to-trade returns that assign a price 
differential to the whole period between two consecutive trades, as proposed by Maynes and 
Rumsey (1993). The results, reported in Panel B show a similar, although slightly larger and 
more significant stock price decline for banks that relied more on wholesale funds during the 
Lehman episode, confirming and strengthening the baseline findings. 
All the previous results used the ratio of retail-deposits to liabilities as an (inverse) measure of a 
banks wholesale dependence. This measure has the advantage of being as close as possible to the 
theoretically  correct  measure  without  sacrificing  much  coverage.  Other  measures  that  are 
probably better proxies of a bank’s reliance on wholesale funds, such as the ratio of money 
market liabilities to total liabilities, would reduce the sample importantly. Nevertheless, there 
are  alternative  measures  that  capture  somewhat  different  aspects  of  a  bank’s  reliance  on 
wholesale funds without sacrificing much sample coverage, or even increasing it. The results 
reported  in  panels  C  and  D  explore  two  of  such  possibilities.  Panel  C  reports  the  CADR 
obtained using the simplest possible measure: the ratio of deposits to liabilities. The difference 
with  the  baseline  measure  is,  of  course,  that  it  does  not  discount  bank  deposits  from  the 
numerator. This measure indeed increases the sample size from 662 to 772 observations. The 
results are similar to the baseline. The overall CADR decline is slightly smaller, but it starts 
from a pre-event level of almost zero, so the differential CADR relative to the pre-event period 
is very similar to that obtained in the baseline results. The statistical significance of the results 
is also largely unaffected. Using the ratio of retail deposits to loans yields similar results (Panel 
D). This measure captures the fraction of a bank’s illiquid assets that are committed to demand 
deposits, so it is not only a measure of wholesale dependence but also of illiquidity. As before, 
the figure exhibits a significant and persistent decline in CADR after the event that reaches 1.5 
percent three days after the event.
13 
B.2 Changes in the event and estimation windows 
The sizes of the event and estimation windows are arbitrary choices in an event study. The 
estimation  window  has  to  be  long  enough  for  the  structural  parameters  to  be  precisely 
estimated, but not as long as to cover structurally different periods (Armitage, 1995; Campbell 
                                                 
13 The results for the ratio of money market liabilities to total liabilities, which reduce the sample to 578 
banks, are similar although significant only when the CADR is compared to the pre-event difference in 
abnormal returns.  33 
 
et al., 1997). The event window must include the event day, enough days after the event to 
capture any lagged event impact, and enough days before the event to detect if there is a pre-
event trend in the abnormal returns. 
The baseline results use an estimation window of 180 calendar days (about 120 trading days) 
before June 30, 2007 (with at least 60 price observations in this period to be included in the 
sample), and an event window of 10 trading days before and after each event. Appendix Figure 
2 shows the CADR obtained with different values of these windows. Panels A and B maintain 
the 10 day event window and change the estimation window to 150 and 120 calendar days 
respectively (with a minimum of 50 and 40 days of data in each case, respectively). Panels C 
and D maintain the 120 trading day estimation window but report results for 15 and 5-day 
event  windows.  The  results  are  qualitatively  similar  to  the  baseline.  Although  there  are 
differences in the final CADR, they are largely due to differences in the CADR one day before 
the event resulting from pre-existing trends. The post event CADR is about 2 percentage points 
in all cases.  
B.3 Changes in the sample 
The baseline sample includes a large number of countries and banks (44 and 662, respectively). 
The  estimation  of  the baseline  parameters  also  dropped  observations  with  implausibly  large 
returns. Nevertheless, it is still possible that large return movements in specific countries or 
banks  could  be  driving  the  results.  To  check  that  this  is  not  the  case,  I  re-estimated  the 
evolution of the CADR dropping one country at a time and one bank at a time; Appendix 
Figure 3 summarizes the findings. Panel A shows the evolution of the mean, min, and max 
CADR (point by point) obtained dropping one country at a time. Therefore, the figure shows 
the whole range of estimated CADR obtained after modifying the sample as described above. 
Panel B does the same for the exercise of dropping one bank at a time.  In both cases, the 
baseline and the mean are so similar than they look identical in the plots. The results show that 
individual countries or banks do not drive the baseline results. Even the least favorable path of 
the CADR shows a one percent relative decline in the abnormal returns of banks with high 
wholesale dependence. As expected, the results are close to the benchmark when dropping one 
bank at a time, since each bank represents a smaller fraction of the total observations. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Wholesale
Country Name Number of Banks Mean Median Standard Deviation Dependence
Argentina 6 0.5848 0.6218 0.2879 -0.4450
Australia 9 0.5593 0.5579 0.2332 -0.4335
Austria 7 0.5143 0.5535 0.2467 -0.4013
Belgium 2 0.3636 0.3636 0.2319 -0.3029
Brazil 14 0.4205 0.3638 0.2232 -0.3395
Canada 9 0.5351 0.6004 0.2966 -0.4093
Chile 7 0.6300 0.7037 0.2592 -0.4749
China 10 0.8022 0.8253 0.1111 -0.5872
Colombia 5 0.7614 0.7918 0.1022 -0.5647
Czech Republic 1 0.8785 0.8785 -0.6305
Denmark 35 0.6430 0.6342 0.1905 -0.4898
Egypt 11 0.8797 0.9243 0.1205 -0.6291
France 33 0.2287 0.2367 0.2006 -0.1936
Germany 31 0.3468 0.2678 0.3123 -0.2726
Greece 13 0.7626 0.7859 0.1354 -0.5639
Hong Kong 13 0.5755 0.7839 0.4035 -0.4184
Hungary 2 0.3354 0.3354 0.4743 -0.2566
India 39 0.8010 0.8483 0.1679 -0.5834
Indonesia 17 0.7491 0.8415 0.2890 -0.5418
Ireland 4 0.4020 0.4504 0.1548 -0.3330
Israel 9 0.7651 0.8630 0.2858 -0.5523
Italy 29 0.3931 0.4609 0.2618 -0.3134
Japan 95 0.9078 0.9475 0.1394 -0.6426
Korea 4 0.6150 0.6292 0.0843 -0.4783
Malaysia 17 0.4899 0.5804 0.2960 -0.3770
Mexico 3 0.7752 0.8193 0.0996 -0.5728
Morocco 8 0.5280 0.6728 0.3741 -0.3950
Netherlands 5 0.4372 0.4187 0.3315 -0.3404
Norway 13 0.4482 0.5108 0.1669 -0.3635
Pakistan 31 0.6046 0.7544 0.2982 -0.4530
Peru 1 0.8404 0.8404 -0.6100
Philippines 10 0.7965 0.8425 0.1938 -0.5796
Poland 13 0.7609 0.7746 0.1289 -0.5632
Portugal 5 0.5729 0.5508 0.1359 -0.4501
Russia 2 0.9181 0.9181 0.0317 -0.6513
Singapore 7 0.2810 0.0072 0.3529 -0.2160
South Africa 10 0.6102 0.6479 0.2579 -0.4633
Spain 10 0.5811 0.5660 0.0605 -0.4575
Sweden 7 0.3568 0.3758 0.1782 -0.2968
Switzerland 29 0.5876 0.6413 0.2346 -0.4499
Taiwan 35 0.5231 0.6843 0.3469 -0.3929
Thailand 17 0.6563 0.8514 0.3795 -0.4734
Turkey 13 0.6351 0.7161 0.2908 -0.4734
United Kingdom 21 0.3249 0.3713 0.3291 -0.2528
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Wholesale
All Banks Investment Banks Commercial Banks Other Banks Public Banks Foreign Banks Dependence
Number of banks 662 55 398 209 81 42 662
Mean 0.6115 0.2792 0.7429 0.4487 0.7490 0.6904 -0.4558
Standard Deviation 0.3105 0.3282 0.2200 0.3119 0.1885 0.2717 0.2148
Median 0.6979 0.1012 0.8205 0.5070 0.8027 0.7730 -0.5294
Interquartile difference (p75 - p25) 0.4551 0.5904 0.2856 0.5412 0.1844 0.2426 0.2787
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Wholesale Total Liquid Assets to
Dependence Assets Total Assets
Wholesale Dependence 1.0000
Leverage 0.5700 1.0000
Total Assets -0.2800 -0.6000 1.0000
Liquid Assets to Total Assets -0.1500 0.0900 -0.0400 1.0000
Leverage
Ratio of retail deposits to liabilities
Panel C - Correlation of bank specific data.
Panel B - Complete sample summary statistics for the ratio of retail deposits to liabilities.
Table 1 - Use of non-deposit sources of funds across countries
Ratio of retail deposits to liabilities
Panel A shows summary statistics by country for the 662 banks that were present in the event study. Panel B shows summary statistics for the complete sample of banks. Panel C shows the
correlation matrix of bank characteristics. Bank data comes from the latest available balance sheet before June 30, 2007 from the Bankscope database. The ratio of retail deposits to liabilities is
measured as the ratio of Total Deposits minus Bank Deposits over Total Liabilities ((Total Deposits - Bank Deposits) / Total Liabilities). Wholesale dependence is the transformation of the ratio
of retail deposits to liabilities to -ln( 1 + ratio of retail deposits to liabilities).
Panel A - Cross country summary statistics for the ratio of retail deposits to liabilities.(1) (2) (3) (4)
Growth in Loans Change in Loans Growth in Loans to Assets Change in Loans to Assets
Wholesale Dependence -2.3498** -71.5628** -0.7241 -0.2688*
(0.9815) (29.2697) (0.8898) (0.1430)
Size 0.6213* -5.4626** -0.0104 0.0009
(0.3165) (2.2015) (0.0599) (0.0107)
Initial Loans -0.5332 0.0174*** -0.6766** -0.0041***
(0.3365) (0.0035) (0.3080) (0.0010)
Constant -2.2629 59.3701* -0.3864 0.1819
(1.5200) (31.9386) (1.3295) (0.2435)
Country Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 567 567 567 567
Adj. R-squared 0.185 0.828 0.105 0.225
Table 2 - Changes in bank's loans and wholesale dependence around Lehman
The dependent variables are the average monthly growth rate of customer loans (Loans growth in Column (1)), the average monthly change in the amount of
customer loans (Change in loans in Column (2)), the average monthly growth rate of the customer loans to assets ratio (Loans to Assets Growth in Column (3)),
and the average monthly change in the customer loans to assets ratio (Change in Loans to Assets in Column (4)), all computed between the latest bank balance
sheet before September 15, 2008, and the first balance sheet availabe after that date. Growth rates are expressed in percentage points and loans in billions of local
currency. Initial loans correspond to the log of loans and loans to assets (columns (1) and (3)), and to the level of loans and loan to asset ratio (columns (2) and
(4)). All these initial values are from the latest bank balance sheet before September 15, 2008. Wholesale dependence is measured as -ln( 1 + ratio of retail
deposits to liabilities), Size is measured as (log) total assets. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.Figure 1 - Increased reliance on wholesale funding
The two panels of the figure show the average fraction of non-deposit liabilities (1-
deposits/liabilities) among banks in the 44 countries included in the sample of the
paper. All average ratios are depicted as a fraction of the 2001 average. 
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2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
YearFigure 2 - Distribution of news related to the financial crisis
All figures show the number of news in English that had the word crisis and either financial, finance or subprime from the Dow Jones Factiva database. Panel A shows the
number of news by month using all sources. Panel B shows monthly growth rate of news using all sources. Panel C shows the number of news each day fifteen days around
September 15, 2008 using the US main sources. Panel D shows the number of news each day fifteen days around August 9, 2007 using the US main sources.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Source: FactivaFigure 3 - Ted Spread and LIBOR-OIS Spread (2005-2009)
The figure shows the Ted Spread (difference between the 3-month US LIBOR and US Treasury Bill rate)
and the LIBOR-OIS (difference between the 3-month US LIBOR and the overnight interest swap rate)
from November 2004 to November 2009. The dashed line on the left is on August 9, 2007 and the dashed















































































































Ted Spread Libor - OISEvent Event
Day Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Day Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Mean Mean Mean Mean
Panel C. Point and cumulative abnormal returns estimators.
Point Estimators CAR Estimators Relative Point Estimators Relative CAR Estimators
Figure 4 - Average cumulative abnormal returns of global banking sector
Panels A and B show the average cumulative abnormal returns of the global banking sector in a window of ten days before and after the Lehman event of September 15, 2008, along their 90
percent confidence bands. Panel A shows the simple cumulative abnormal returns, and Panel B shows the cumulative differential return relative to the pre-event average abnormal return
(the average abnormal return between t=-10 and t=-1). Panel C shows the point and cumulative estimates of the average abnormal returns for the event, along their standard errors. *, **,
and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.























-10 -0.19 0.31 -0.19 0.31 -10 - -
-9 -0.01 0.31 -0.20 0.43 -9 - -
-8 0.20 0.31 -0.01 0.53 -8 - -
-7 -0.04 0.31 -0.05 0.61 -7 - -
-6 0.15 0.31 0.10 0.68 -6 - -
-5 0.87 *** 0.31 0.97 0.75 -5 - -
-4 0.23 0.31 1.20 0.81 -4 - -
-3 0.29 0.31 1.49 * 0.87 -3 - -
-2 -0.55 * 0.31 0.95 0.92 -2 - -
-1 0.03 0.31 0.98 0.97 -1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0 -0.93 *** 0.31 0.04 1.02 0 -1.03 ** 0.40 -1.03 *** 0.29
1 -0.69 ** 0.31 -0.64 1.06 1 -0.79 * 0.40 -1.82 *** 0.47
2 -0.25 0.31 -0.89 1.10 2 -0.35 0.40 -2.17 *** 0.60
3 -1.00 *** 0.31 -1.89 * 1.15 3 -1.10 *** 0.40 -3.27 *** 0.72
4 0.48 0.31 -1.41 1.19 4 0.38 0.40 -2.88 *** 0.82
5 0.01 0.31 -1.40 1.22 5 -0.08 0.40 -2.96 *** 0.91
6 -0.03 0.31 -1.42 1.26 6 -0.13 0.40 -3.09 *** 1.00
7 0.13 0.31 -1.29 1.30 7 0.04 0.40 -3.05 *** 1.07
8 0.02 0.31 -1.27 1.33 8 -0.08 0.40 -3.13 *** 1.15
9 -0.24 0.31 -1.51 1.37 9 -0.33 0.40 -3.47 *** 1.22































Event timeThe figure shows the cumulative abnormal returns of banks with low and high wholesale dependence (25th and 75th percentile of wholesale dependence) in a window of ten days
before and after the Lehman event of September 15, 2008 (Panel A), the difference in cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between those two groups of banks and
its 90 percent confidence bands (Panel B), and the difference in cumulative abnormal differential returns relative to the pre-event difference (the average difference in abnormal
returns between these two groups of banks between t=-10 and t=-1) (Panel C). The bank level abnormal returns come from a one factor market model, and the standard errors
used to construct the confidence bands are robust to heteroskedasticity.
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Returns by groups. Panel B. CADR, interquartile difference on wholesale dependence.
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Panel C. Point and cumulative abnormal returns estimators.
Point Estimators CAR Estimators Relative Point Estimators Relative CAR Estimators
Figure 6 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence
Baseline specification
Panels A and B show the difference in cumulative abnormal returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global distribution of
wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands in a window of ten days before and after the Lehman event of September 15, 2008. Panel A shows the simple cumulative
abnormal differential returns, and Panel B shows the cumulative differential return relative to the pre-event average abnormal return (the average abnormal return between t=-10 and t=-
1). Panel C shows the point and cumulative estimates of the average abnormal differential returns for each of the events, along their standard errors. The standard errors are robust to
heteroskedasticity. *, **, and *** represent statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.









































































Day Std. Dev. Std. Dev. Day Std. Dev. Std. Dev.
-10 -0.14 0.13 -0.14 0.13 -10 - -
-9 -0.07 0.20 -0.21 0.24 -9 - -
-8 -0.09 0.15 -0.30 0.29 -8 - -
-7 -0.36 ** 0.18 -0.66 * 0.34 -7 - -
-6 -0.17 0.16 -0.83 ** 0.38 -6 - -
-5 0.11 0.17 -0.72 * 0.41 -5 - -
-4 -0.11 0.15 -0.83 * 0.44 -4 - -
-3 0.30 * 0.16 -0.53 0.47 -3 - -
-2 -0.41 *** 0.15 -0.94 * 0.49 -2 - -
-1 0.00 0.15 -0.94 * 0.51 -1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
0 -0.41 ** 0.18 -1.36 ** 0.54 0 -0.32 * 0.19 -0.32 * 0.19
1 -0.42 * 0.25 -1.77 *** 0.60 1 -0.33 0.25 -0.65 ** 0.32
2 -0.44 * 0.24 -2.22 *** 0.64 2 -0.35 0.24 -0.99 ** 0.42
3 -0.34 0.30 -2.56 *** 0.71 3 -0.25 0.30 -1.24 ** 0.53
4 0.19 0.38 -2.37 *** 0.80 4 0.28 0.38 -0.96 0.67
5 0.20 0.21 -2.17 *** 0.83 5 0.30 0.22 -0.67 0.72
6 -0.03 0.18 -2.20 *** 0.85 6 0.07 0.19 -0.60 0.77
7 0.12 0.16 -2.08 ** 0.87 7 0.21 0.17 -0.38 0.81
8 0.03 0.23 -2.05 ** 0.90 8 0.12 0.24 -0.26 0.87
9 -0.09 0.15 -2.14 ** 0.91 9 0.01 0.15 -0.26 0.91


















































































Event timeFigure 7 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence
Credit Markets Freeze Event, August 9, 2007
Panel A shows the cumulative abnormal returns of the global banking sector in a window of ten days before and after the Market Freeze event of August 9, 2007, along their 90
percent confidence bands. Panel A.1 shows the simple cumulative abnormal returns, and Panel A.2 shows the cumulative differential return relative to the pre-event average
abnormal return (the average abnormal return between t=-10 and t=-1). Panel B shows the difference in cumulative abnormal returns (CADR) between a bank with high and
low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands in a window of ten days before and
after the Market Freeze event of August 9, 2007. Panel B.1 shows the simple cumulative abnormal differential returns, and Panel B.2 shows the cumulative differential return
relative to the pre-event average abnormal return.
A1. Cumulative Abnormal Returns. A2. Cumulative Abnormal Returns relative to pre-event.






























Panel B. Interquartile difference on wholesale dependence.

































































































Event timeFigure 8 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence
Alternative events during the crisis
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global
distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands. In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns come from a return model that controls for a country's
market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are robust to heteroskedasticity, and the estimation includes country-time fixed
effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns across countries. Panel A shows the results for an event dated on March 14, 2008 andP a n e lBs h o w sf o ra n
event dated on October 2, 2008.
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Event timePanel B. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
Controlling by bank characteristics
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and
25th percentile of the global distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands (panels on the left) and the
cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low bank-specific control (75th and 25th percentile of the
global distribution of control variable) and its 90 percent confidence bands (panels on the right). In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns
come from a return model that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the
confidence bands are robust to heteroskedasticity, and the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in
average abnormal returns across countries. Panel A shows the results after controlling for banks leverage. Panel B shows the results after
controlling for banks size. Panel C shows the results after controlling for banks assets composition. All panels show results for an event
window of ten trading days around the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
A.1 Wholesale funding dependence. A.2 Leverage.
Figure 9 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence














































































Panel C. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
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Event timeControlling by bank ownership and counterparty risk
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and
25th percentile of the global distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands (panels on the left) and the
cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between banks with a bank-specific characteristic (dummy equals 1 if bank has
characteristic and 0 if it doesn’t) and its 90 percent confidence (panels on the right). In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns come from a
return model that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are
robust to heteroskedasticity, and the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal
returns across countries. Panel A shows the results after controlling for banks that have public ownership. Panel B shows the results after
controlling for banks that have foreign ownership. Panel C shows the results after controlling for banks that declared exposure to Lehman
Brothers. All panels show results for an event window of ten trading days around the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
A.1 Wholesale funding dependence. A.2 Public ownership dummy.
Figure 10 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence
Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
















































































Panel C. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure.
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Event timeB.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return. B.2 Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns.
Figure 11 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks with high and low wholesale dependence
Panel B - Commercial banks.
A.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return.
Panel A shows the average cumulative abnormal returns for investment banks (panel on the left) and the cumulative abnormal differential
returns (CADR) between an investment bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global distribution of
wholesale dependence among the group) with its 90 percent confidence bands (panel to the right). Panel B and Panel C show the same results
for commercial banks and other banks, respectively. In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns come from a return model that controls for a
country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are robust to heteroskedasticity, and
the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns across countries. All panels show
results for an event window of ten trading days around the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
Controlling by type of bank
Panel A. Investment banks..

















































C.1 Cumulative Abnormal Return.
Panel C - Other banks.
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Event timePanel B. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure of wholesale dependence.
B.1 Countries with low international reserves. B.2 Countries with high international reserves.
Figure 12 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks
Controlling by deposit insurance, international reserves, power of supervisory authority, and vulnerability to a liquidity crunch
Panel A compares the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th
and 25th percentile of the global distribution of wholesale dependence) for all banks in a country with low (panels on the left) and high
(panels on the right) deposit insurance (below and above the median of deposit insurance across countries respectively). The dashed lines
correspond to the 90 percent confidence bands of the CADR. Panel B and Panel C show the same results for countries with low and high
international reserves and power of supervisory authority, respectively. In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns come from a return model
that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are robust to
heteroskedasticity, and the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns across
countries. All panels show results for an event window of ten trading days around the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
Panel A. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure of wholesale dependence.









































































C.2 Countries with high power of supervisory authority.
Panel C. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure of wholesale dependence.
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Event timePanel A. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure of wholesale dependence.
A.1 Countries with low capital account openness. A.2 Countries with high capital account openness.
Figure 13 - Cumulative abnormal differential returns of banks
Controlling by country's integration to international financial system and vulnerability to a liquidity crunch
The figure compares the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global
distribution of wholesale dependence) for all banks in a country with low (panels on the left) and high (panels on the right) country integration to international financial system
(below and above the median of the country control). The dashed lines correspond to the 90 percent confidence bands of the CADR. In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns
come from a return model that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are robust to
heteroskedasticity, and the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns across countries. Panel A shows the results
after controlling for country’s capital account openness. Panel B shows the results after controlling for the country’s fraction of external loans to total bank assets. All panels
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Panel B. Cumulative Abnormal Differential Returns, interquartile difference on continuous measure of wholesale dependence.
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Event timeData Source
Complete balance sheet data for banks in 45 countries from 2006 to 2008. Bankscope
End of day data for listed banks stock price. Bloomberg
End of day data for the FTSE Market Index and the FTSE Banking Index. Datastream
Daily data on the TED spread and the LIBOR-OIS spread from 2005 to 2009. Datastream
Number of news related to the financial crisis from Janaury 2007 to July 2009. Dow Jones Factiva
Country index of Deposit Insurance. Demriguc-Kunt et al. (2005)
Total country holdings of securities. Lane and Milesi-Ferretti (2007)
Total country holdings of US securities. US Treasury Department
Bank ownership data (foreign/state). Micco and Panizza (2006)
Data on country's international reserves. IMF - International Financial Statistics
Data on country's financial system assets. Beck et al. (2000)
Country index of independence of supervisory authority. Barth et al. (2005)
Country index of capital account openness. Ito and Chinn (2008)
External report on the amount outstanding of deposits and loans. Bank of International Settlements
Appendix Table 1 - Data appendix
The table shows the main data sources used in the paper.Constant Country Beta Banking Sector Beta R
2
Mean 0 0513 0 4400 0 2876 0 3016
Appendix Table 2 - Model returns estimation summary statistics
The table shows the summary statistics of the coefficients of the two factor model regression:
of all the banks included in the event study using lumped returns. The estimation window used was of 180 calendar days before June 30, 
t c i t c c i c i t c i R R , , , , , , , ε β α + ⋅ + =
Mean 0.0513 0.4400 0.2876 0.3016
Median 0.0180 0.3644 0.2135 0.2560
Fraction of banks above 10% 8% 52% 48%
Fraction of banks above 5% 3% 44% 41%
Fraction of banks above 1% 0% 33% 32%
The table shows the summary statistics of the coefficients of the two factor model regression:
of all the banks included in the event study using lumped returns. The estimation window used was of 180 calendar days before June 30, 
t c i t c c i c i t c i R R , , , , , , , ε β α + ⋅ + =Appendix Figure 1 - Changes in the measures of abnormal returns and wholesale dependence
The figure shows the difference in cumulative abnormal returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global
distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands for different measures of abnormal returns and wholesale dependence. In all cases the bank-level
abnormal returns come from a two factor return model that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, and the standard errors used to construct the confidence
bands are robust to heteroskedasticity. All differences are reported after controlling for country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns
across countries. Panel A shows the CADR using an estimation window of 120 trading days immediately before the beginning of the event window. Panel B uses trade to trade
returns to compute the return model and derive the abnormal returns. Panel C uses the ratio of total deposits to liabilities as measure of wholesale dependence. Finally, panel D
uses the ratio of retail deposits to loans. All panels show results for the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
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Event timeAppendix Figure 2 - Changes in the event and estimation windows
The figure shows the cumulative abnormal differential returns (CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global
distribution of wholesale dependence) and its 90 percent confidence bands for different event and estimation windows. In all cases, bank-level abnormal returns come from a
return model that controls for a country's market and banking sector returns, the standard errors used to construct the confidence bands are robust to heteroskedasticity, and
the estimation includes country-time fixed effects to control for daily differences in average abnormal returns across countries. Panels A and B keep a 10 day event window and
use an estimation window of 150 and 120 calendar days before June 30, 2007, respectively, and panels C and D keep an estimation window of 120 trading days before June 30,
2007, and use event windows of 15 and 5 days, respectively. All panels show results for the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
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Event timeAppendix Figure 3 - Changes in the sample
The figure shows the mean, minimum, and maximum of the cumulative abnormal differential returns
(CADR) between a bank with high and low wholesale dependence (75th and 25th percentile of the global
distribution of wholesale dependence) from the preferred specification (two-factor, including country-time
fixed effects). Panel A (B) shows the statistics obtained after dropping each of the 44 (670) countries
(banks) in the sample at a time. All panels show results for the Lehman event of September 15, 2008.
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Baseline Mean Min Max